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CRAFTING A NEW MEANS OF ANALYSIS FOR
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS BASED ON
PROMISES IN EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS
Gabriel S. Rosenthal
Abstract. Over the past twenty years, the concept of employment at will has been eroded
through exceptions permitting employees to sue employers for wrongful discharge under
various theories. One such theory, implied-in-fact contract, grants employees the ability to sue
based on promises made in employee handbooks. Although forty-seven states allow such
claims, their legal analyses have been murky and varied. The reasons for this ambiguity are
twofold. First, courts still feel compelled by the looming presence of employment at will to
base exceptions on traditional theories of contract law. Second, the role of disclaimers has not
been precisely defined. This Comment clarifies implied-in-fact contract analysis and offers a
solution to the above problems. It states the test that the courts actually use in employee
handbook claims-the reasonable expectations of the employee-and lays out the main
factors to be examined in such a test. It then argues that the reasonable expectations test
should be adopted free from the confines of traditional theories of law.
"A man is a worker. If he is not that, he is nothing"
Joseph Conrad
In American society, people often define themselves by the jobs they
hold. Thirty years ago, employers could fire employees and destroy this
identity on a whim, with little worry about legal ramifications. Today,
the law affords employees a greater degree of protection. Judges have
fashioned the common law suit of wrongful discharge to provide
terminated employees with recourse when they are fired under certain
circumstances.' For example, employers cannot lawfully make promises
of job security to employees and then fire them in violation of those
promises.'
Recently, Washington has experienced a deluge of wrongful discharge
claims based upon promises made in employee handbooks Although
the number of claims has rapidly increased, the law governing such
claims has not developed as quickly. The legal analysis employed by
courts in wrongful discharge claims based on employee handbooks
1. See, e.g., Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 226, 685 P.2d 1081, 1086
(1984).
2. Id.
3. This Comment uses Washington to exemplify the unsettled state of law. However, the same
problems exist in many jurisdictions. The solutions proposed are in need of adoption across the
United States.
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remains murky and unsettled. This state of law has produced results
lacking uniformity and predictability. This Comment proposes to clarify
implied-in-fact contract analysis and guide courts in the future.
Part I of this Comment briefly examines the employment at will
background to employee handbook claims. Part II traces the development
of employee handbook claims in Washington. Part III scrutinizes the
current analyses used in employee handbook claims and discusses the
main problems with the present methods. Part IV offers a new method to
solve the current problems and clarify the courts' reasoning. Lastly, part
V argues that adoption of the proposed solution is both necessary and
justified in light of the current status of employment at will and wrongful
discharge law.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND DISMANTLING OF
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
A. History of the Doctrine
The status of the legal relationship between employer and employee
has changed steadily over the past century. During the early nineteenth
century, the law presumed annual employment terms.4 This concept, like
much early American law, was borrowed from England and based upon
the needs of a mostly agrarian society.5 Under this system, the law
ensured that landowners would not lose farm laborers during the busy
harvest season, while also providing laborers with the security of
knowing that their jobs would not be in jeopardy during periods of
decreased agricultural activity.6 This system was well adapted to colonial
America. As America entered the age of the Industrial. Revolution,
however, employment relationships changed and the old agrarian system
was no longer suited to the needs of a quickly developing country.
Out of this period of rapid change and laissez-faire economics came
the concept of employment at will. American professor H.G. Wood first
proffered this concept in his treatise published in 1877. 7 Employment at
will provides that, absent an express agreement to ihe contrary,
4. Jay M. Feinnan, The Development of the Emoloyment at Will Rule, 20 Am..". Legal Hist. 118,
120 (1976).
5. Id.
6. Id. The yearly duration presumption can be traced to the Statute of Laborers, enacted to ensure
stability in England during the Middle Ages. See Morris D. Forkosch, A Treatise on Labor Law 12
(1953); see also I William Blackstone, Commentaries 426.
7. H.G. Wood, A Treatise on the Law ofMaster and Servant (1877).
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employment for an indefinite duration is terminable at any time and for
any reason by either the employer or the employee.8 Though
commentators have noted that Wood's analysis stated a distinct departure
from earlier case law in America,9 and that the four cases Wood relied
upon embraced no such rule," employment at will quickly came to
dominate the employer-employee relationship during the late Nineteenth
century. At a time of constant development and the creation of new
industry, courts believed that employment at will would further
economic growth." Employment at will allowed employees to move
freely from one job to another during a period when American industry
was creating new jobs daily. For the employer, employment at will
provided the legal right to terminate the jobs of employees and to replace
them with more highly skilled or specialized workers. At the time,
employers and employees alike were satisfied.
Over the past twenty years, employment at will has come under a
great deal of criticism from both courts and scholars." Employment at
will was founded upon the assumption that the employer and employee
held equal bargaining positions. 4 In the late twentieth century, this
assumption no longer holds true.' Increased job specialization,
characteristic of twentieth century industry, requires a higher level of
8. Id. at 272 (stating that "a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the
servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof'). For
early examples of American courts applying the employment at will rule, see Clarke v. Atlantic
Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1908) and Greer v. Arlington Mills Manufacturing Co.,
43 A. 609 (Del. Super. Ct. 1899).
9. Richard J. Pratt, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks: Further Encroachments
on the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 197, 199 (1990).
10. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Employee Dismissal Law and Practice § 1.3, at 6 (1984).
11. See Pratt, supra note 9, at 199.
12. Joseph DeGiuseppe, Jr., The Effect of the Employment-at- Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job
Security andFringe Benefits, 10 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1, 7 (1981).
13. See, e.g., Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 226, 685 P.2d 1081, 1086
(1984); Cleary v. American Airlines, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725 (Ct. App. 1980); Woolley v.
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1260, modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); DeGiuseppe,
supra note 12, at 2; Kenneth T. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A
Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. Law. 1, 5 (1984).
14. Michael A. Chagares, Utilization of the Disclaimer as an Effective Means to Define the
Employment Relationship, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 365, 368 (1989); e.g., Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at
226, 685 P.2d at 1086.
15. John D. Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of
Employment at Will, 17 Am. Bus. L.J. 467, 470 (1980); Susan F. Marrinan, Employment at Will:
Pandora's Box May Have an Attractive Cover, 7 Hamline L. Rev. 155, 158-59 (1984).
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training and education. This in turn significantly narrows alternative job
opportunities. 6
Despite workers' increased need for job security, 17 employers still
retained the power to fire them for any reason, good or bad, or even no
reason at all, throughout most of the twentieth century. 8 Prior to the
creation of exceptions to employment at will, courts permitted some
particularly harsh results. Thirty-year employees were fired days before
their pensions vested. 9 Employees were terminated for reporting illegal
activities, refusing sexual advances, or reporting for jury duty.2°
Employers were beginning to abuse the system. Having adopted the
employment-at-will doctrine, the legal community was s*.ow to correct
such abuses. By strictly interpreting employment at will, the courts
continued to allow results that were neither fair nor just fbr wrongfully
terminated employees.
B. The Recent Trend Away from Employment at Will
Although employment at will remains the legal cornerstone for
workplace relationships, the recent trend has been away from strictly
interpreting the doctrine. Some coramentators have called for complete
abdication of employment at will.2 Their rationales vary, but typically
center on the fact that employees need legal protection to counter the
unequal bargaining position that employers hold over employees. 2'
Although the concept of employment at will has been eroded
considerably, the American legal community has proved reluctant to
dismiss it entirely. Instead, both Congress 23 and the judiciary24 have
16. Pratt, supra note 9, at 201.
17. Id.; Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom- On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 1405 (1967).
18. This absolute view of employment at will arguably differs from the rule as originally
enunciated by Wood. The Wood rule only provided that employment for an indefinite duration was
presumed to be at will, but was potentially rebuttable. Wood, supra note 7. This harsher approach
that employment at will was the rule rather than a presumption was later developed by American
courts. See, e.g., Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1908).
19. See Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 93 (N.Y. 1983) (Meyer, J.,
dissenting in part).
20. DeGiuseppe, supra note 12, at 9-10; Pratt, supra note 9, at 200.
21. Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Development of the
Law of WrongulDischarge, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 719 (1991).
22. See id. at 720.
23. Examples of legislatively-created exceptions to employment at will include the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994), the Age Discrimination in Employr: ent Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1994), and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994). State
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created exceptions to the doctrine in an attempt to alleviate some of its
harsh effects.
1. Legislative Enactments
Legislative exceptions were the first to breach the employment-at-will
doctrine. These enactments were largely due to a great deal of
commentary directed against the doctrine.' One of the earliest pieces of
legislation was the National Labor Relations Act, which prohibits
discriminatory acts committed by employers in an effort to discourage
membership in unions.26 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, one of
the best known legislative exceptions to employment at will, makes it
unlawful to discharge any individual because of that individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.27 The Federal Age Discrimination
in Employment Act protects persons between the ages of forty and
seventy from discharge because of age.28 State legislatures joined in the
effort to scale back employment at will by extending protection against
discrimination in employment to other classes of workers as well.29
2. Judicially Created Exceptions-Wrongful Discharge Suits
Legislative bodies are no longer alone in their efforts to level the
playing field in the workplace. Over the past twenty years, courts have
begun to recognize claims for wrongful discharge brought by discharged
employees."0 These claims, along with legislative enactments, have
successfully weakened strict interpretation of the employment-at-will
doctrine. Wrongful discharge claims are based on three major theories:
legislatures have similarly enacted such statutes. See Chagares, supra note 14, at 368-69. A detailed
discussion of such legislatively-created exceptions is beyond the scope of this Comment.
24. See infra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Alfred W. Blumrosen, United States Report, 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 428 (1964),Clyde
W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time For A Statute, 62 Va. L. Rev.
481 (1976).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
29. 8A Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Fair Empl. Practice. Manual § 451, at 101-05 (1993). Examples
of such further protection include prohibitions of discrimination based on handicapped or marital
status. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180(1) (1996).
30. Chagares, supra note 14, at 369. See generally Sami M. Abbasi et al., Employment at Will: An
Eroding Concept in Employment Relationships, 38 Lab. L.J. 21 (1987).
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public policy, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
implied-in-fact contract limitations.
a. Public Policy Exception ahd Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing
By permitting wrongful discharge claims based on either a public
policy exception or a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing," the courts have illustrated their willingness to stray from
employment at will under limited circumstances. The public policy
exception provides for potential tort liability if employers fire employees
for a reason contrary to a clearly defined public policy.32 Thompson v. St.
Regis Paper Company33 was the first case to establish tHis exception in
Washington. Presently, forty-three states permit suits based on the public
policy exception. 4
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, &a exception not
recognized in Washington, limits an employer's right to discharge an
employee when the employer breaches an implied-in-law covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in the employment contract.35 Wrongful
discharge claims based on the im-plied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing are not as widely accepted as the public policy exception, but
still diminish the strength of employment at will in nine states.36
31. A closer examination of these theories is beyond the scope of this Comment. They are
mentioned to illustrate the number of encroachments on the employment-at-will doctrine.
32. The first case in the nation to establish tht public policy exception to emrIoyment at will was
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1959).
33. 102 Wash. 2d 219,226, 685 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1984).
34. Alabama, see Williams v. Killough, 474 So. 2d 680 (Ala. 1985), Georgia, see Evans v. Bibb
Co., 342 S.E.2d 484 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986), Ohio, see Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 491 N.E.2d
1114 (Ohio 1986), and Wyoming, see Allen v. Safeway Stores, 699 P.2d 277 XWyo. 1985), do not
recognize claims based on the public policy exception. Delaware, Maine, and Utah are unresolved.
35. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977). In such
cases, general terms in an employment handbook promising fair or good treatment create the alleged
obligation.
36. Nine states allow claims based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See
Hoffman-La Roche v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987); Mitford v. LASALA, 666 P.2d 1000
(Alaska 1983); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Aiz. 1985); Cleary v.
American Airlines, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 479 A.2d 781
(Conn. 1984); Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at 1251; Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 6:18 P.2d 1063 (Mont.
1982); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d
549 (N.H. 1974). Delaware, Iowa, Mississippi, see Robinson v. Board of Trustees of E. Cent. Junior
College, 477 So. 2d 1352 (Miss. 1985), Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming, see Rompf v. John
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b. Implied-in-Fact Contract
The third branch of liability in wrongful discharge claims is the
implied-in-fact contract theory of recovery. This exception to
employment at will discourages employers from making empty promises
to employees.37 When such empty promises are made, employees may
continue to work under expectations of certain conduct on their
employers' part, potentially forgoing other job opportunities in reliance
on those expectations.3" Courts allowing implied-in-fact contract claims
find that employers should not be allowed to induce workers to remain in
their present positions with promises of certain treatment and then break
those promises using employment at will as a safety net.39 This theory of
recovery permits promissory terms communicated from employer to
employee to alter the at-will status of employment. Such
communications may come in the form of pre-employment statements
made in negotiations,40 oral assurances made while employed,4 or
employee handbooks and manuals distributed to employees.42
II. IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT SUITS BASED UPON
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS IN WASHINGTON
Employee handbooks are the most common source of implied-in-fact
contract claims,43 and also the type of claim that has led to the current
confused state of the law. This section summarizes the main Washington
Q. Hammons Hotels Inc., 685 P.2d 25 (Wyo. 1984), are either unresolved or have not specifically
dealt with the issue.
37. Chagares, supra note 14, at 372-73.
38. Id.
39. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.NV.2d 880, 890 (Mich. 1980); Thompson v.
St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219,229-30, 685 P.2d 1081, 1087-88 (1984) (en banc).
40. See, e.g., Integon Life Ins. v. Vandegrift, 669 S.W.2d 492 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984).
41. See, e.g., Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (enforcing
generally oral statements to employees they can only be terminated for cause); Eales v. Tanana
Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983) (enforcing oral lifetime
employment contract); Terrio v. Millinocket Community Hosp., 379 A.2d 135 (Me. 1977) (enforcing
oral promise of employment for definite period of time).
42. Chagares, supra note 14, at 373; see, e.g., Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 688
P.2d 170 (Ariz. 1984); Duldulao v. Saint Mary Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314 (Ill. 1987);
Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081; Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702
(Wyo. 1985).
43. Chagares, supra note 14, at 373 n.69.
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case in the area and provides an overview of the analysis required by
such claims.'
A. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper.Co.
In Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.,4  the Washington Supreme Court
first recognized a wrongful discharge claim based upon implied-in-fact
contract theory. The facts were typical of implied-in-fact contract claims.
During his employment with the St. Regis Paper Company, Thompson
was promoted several times and awarded regular bonuses under an
incentive plan.46 After seventeen years, however, Thompson was asked
to resign. The only reason Thompson was given in explanation of his
termination was that he "had stepped on somebody's toes."'47 In his
complaint, Thompson alleged that certain provisions of an employee
handbook, together with his good employment record, created an implied
contract that he would be terminated only for cause.4 8 The court
examined two portions of the employee handbook. One provision
promised to treat employees in a fair, just, and reasonable manner.49 The
second pertinent section of the employee handbook provided for a
probationary period during which employees could be terminated.'
The trial court found no implied contract."1 The court determined that
Thompson was terminable at will and dismissed the suit.52 According to
the trial court, the two sections of the employee handbook were
insufficient to create an implied contract, and Thompson could be
terminated at any time for any reason under traditional employment at
will theory.
The Washington Supreme Court granted direct review and reversed
the superior court's summary judgment dismissal.5 3 In finding that
Thompson had a potentially valid claim, the Washington Supreme Court
followed other cases recognizing the "employee handbook" exception.
44. This Comment uses Washington to exemplify the confused state of law ngarding implied-in-
fact contract claims, but the same problems exist in jurisdictions across the United States.
45. 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081.
46. Id. at 221, 685 P.2d at 1083.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 222, 685 P.2d at 1084.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 223, 685 P.2d at 1084.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 221,685 P.2d at 1083.
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Quoting one of the seminal employee handbook cases, Toussaint v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield,54 the Thompson court explained that, "where an
employer chooses to establish such policies and practices and makes
them known to its employees, the employment relationship is
presumably enhanced .... The employer has then created a situation
'instinct with an obligation."' 55 According to the court, the "situation"
created by the employer was an implied-in-fact contract, binding the
employer to whatever it promised in the handbook.56
B. The Multi-Layered Analytical Framework
The type of claim outlined in Thompson seems simple and
straightforward at first glance, but such claims are exceedingly complex.
This is due in large part to the several layers of legal doctrine that courts
must examine in wrongful discharge suits under the implied-in-fact
contract theory. The many layers oscillate in their effect: one provides a
clear-cut rule in the employer's favor and the next permits the
employee's suit. How to reconcile the legal layers is a question that is
unanswered.
The first layer in a wrongful discharge analysis involves the
employment-at-will doctrine. When a private employer hires an
employee in Washington, employment at will forms the legal foundation
of the relationship, absent an express agreement to the contrary.57 Hence,
the relationship is terminable at will by either the employer or the
employee at any time and for any reason.
The second layer of analysis involves employee handbooks. Under the
rule set forth in Thompson, if the employer issues an employee handbook
with promises of particular treatment in certain situations, those promises
become enforceable components of the employment relationship." The
employer is no longer protected by the umbrella of employment at will
and may be susceptible to a wrongful discharge suit for a termination
contrary to promises made in the handbook.
54. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
55. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 229-30, 685 P.2d at 1087-88 (quoting Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at
892).
56. Id.
57. Roberts v. ARCO, 88 Wash. 2d 887, 894, 568 P.2d 764, 768 (1977); Lasser v. Grunbaum
Bros. Furniture Co., 46 Wash. 2d 408,410,281 P.2d 832, 833 (1955).
58. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088.
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The third layer, also originating in the Thompson decision, involves
disclaimers. In dicta, the Washington Supreme Court staled that even if
an employer issues an employee handbook with promises of specific
treatment in specific circumstances, it may avoid an implied-in-fact
contract obligation with a disclaimer. 9 The court explained that if the
employer sufficiently states its intent not to be bound, courts should
interpret otherwise binding provisions in the handbook as general
statements of policy rather than promises of specific treatment.60 The
disclaimer tips the scale back in favor of the employer, possibly leaving
the employee with no recourse.
Recent cases have created yet a fourth layer that permits employees to
bind the employer even if a valid disclaimer exists. Several jurisdictions,
including Washington,6 now permit an employer's inconsistent
representations to negate the effect of a disclaimer.62 Statements that
contradict the disclaimer, such as oral assurances or mandatory language
in an employee handbook, can invalidate the disclaimer's legal effect.
Once the disclaimer is invalidated, provisions of the handbook may once
again form the basis of an implied-in-fact contract obligation.63
Though Thompson and other cases provide a framework for working
through an implied-in-fact contract claim, they leave several questions
unanswered. For example: What types of statements in an employee
handbook will bind an employer? What exactly is a valid disclaimer?
What types of subsequent employer conduct will negate a valid
disclaimer? These questions are difficult to answer when examined
independently. When looked at together, in conjunction with a single
claim, they cause utter confusion.
59. Id. at 230-31, 685 P.2d at 1088.
60. Id.
61. See Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 118 Wash. 2d 512, 532, 826 P.2d 664, 674 (1992). There,
the court permitted a claim to proceed even though a valid disclaimer exisied. The court used
statements in a memorandum issued by the employer, subsequent to distribution of the employee
handbook, to override the disclaimer. The memo-andum listed specific acts of employee conduct that
were sufficient cause for discharge without notice and stated that "in all other instances of
misconduct, at least one warning, shall be given." Id. at 515, 826 P.2d at 666. The employee was
fired without warning for a reason not on the list.
62. For examples of courts outside of Washington permitting inconsistent representations to
negate disclaimers, see Zaccardi v. Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir. 1988) and Johnson v.
NASCA, 802 P.2d 1294 (Okla. 1990).
63. Swanson, 118 Wash. 2d at 532, 826 P.2d at 674.
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III. PROBLEMS WITH COURTS' ANALYSIS IN WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE CLAIMS UNDER IMPLIED-IN-FACT
CONTRACT THEORY
A. Forcing Implied-in-Fact Contract Suits into Traditional Legal
Theories
Though an overwhelming majority of courts recognize implied-in-fact
contract claims,' dispute exists among and within jurisdictions as to the
appropriate theory for recovery. Judges, attorneys, and commentators
rely on two main theories: unilateral contract and equitable principles.
Case law contains examples of each theory and reflects the division of
opinion.
1. Unilateral Contract
In Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.,65 the New Jersey Supreme
Court relied on unilateral contract theory as the basis for analyzing and
permitting a wrongful discharge claim under the implied-in-fact contract
theory. The employee, Richard Woolley, had received a personnel policy
manual shortly after beginning work for Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.' The
manual set forth company policy regarding employee termination, listing
possible causes for discharge, and detailing the procedure.67 The
employer terminated Woolley without cause and without following the
handbook procedures.68
Woolley sued Hoffman-La Roche, alleging breach of contract.69 He
argued that the express and implied promises contained in the employee
handbook provided grounds for an enforceable contract.7" The trial court
64. Only six states do not permit implied-in-fact contract suits: Delaware, see Heideck v. Kent
Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); Florida, see Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427
So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Georgia, see Garmon v. Group Health, Inc., 359 S.E.2d 450
(Ga. Ct App. 1987); Indiana, see Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975);
Missouri, see Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988); and North
Carolina, see Harris v. Duke Power Co., 356 S.E..2d 357 (N.C. 1987). Three states are either
unresolved or have not dealt with the issue: New Hampshire, Rhode Island, see Roy v. Woonsocket
Inst. for Say., 525 A.2d 915 (R.I. 1987), and Louisiana.
65. 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985).
66. Id. at 1258.
67. Id. at 1271-73.
68. Id. at 1258.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the
complaint, finding that Hoffman-La Roche was not contractually boundby materials in its handbook. 7' The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.
In arriving at its decision, the court found present the elements of offer,
acceptance, and consideration." The employee's reasonable expectation
of certain behavior on the employer's part was the key element to the
court's recognition of an offer of a unilateral contract.73 The court found
acceptance through the employee's performing once on the: job.74 Finally,
the court concluded that the employee provided consideration by
continuing to work when he was not bound to do so.'
Courts and commentators have pointed out several problems that arise
when courts attempt to use unilateral contract law as the basis on which
to analyze implied-in-fact wrongful discharge claims. 76 In characterizing
an employee handbook as a unilateral expression of general company
policy and procedure as opposed to binding, contractual language, courts
and commentators have noted that the terms are not bargained for by the
parties, and no meeting of the minds occurs. 77 Hence, two of the essential
elements to a contract are lacking.78
Seemingly mindful of its departure from not only employment law but
also existing contract law, the Woolley court relied heavily on policy
considerations such as basic honesty and fairness. Althcugh the court
stated these considerations clearly in its opinion, its legal analysis relied
on the law of contracts. 79 Regrettably, the court never addressed the
missing contract elements of mutuality and bargained for exchange.
Thus, the extent to which the decision wholly relies on contract law is
unclear.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1264-67.
73. Id. at 1265-66.
74. Id. at 1267.
75. Id.
76. See Michael A. Chagares, Limiting the Employment-at-Will Rule: Enforcing Policy Manual
Promises Through Unilateral Contract Analysis, 16 Seton Hall L. Rev 465 (1986); see also Johnson
v. National Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779, 781-82 (Kan. 1976).
77. See Johnson, 551 P.2d at 781-82; Chagares, supra note 76.
78. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17 (1981) for the requirement of bargained for
exchange. Mutuality is a common law requirement developed by the courts. See Dawson et al.,
Cases and Comment on Contracts 328 (6th ed. 1993).
79. Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1264-67.
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2. Equitable Principles
Although Woolley is the seminal case interpreting implied-in-fact
contract wrongful discharge claims under unilateral contract law,
Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield" is considered the benchmark
for application of the equitable principles doctrine. In Toussaint, an
employee had been given a personnel policy manual containing a
statement that the employer would terminate its employees "for just
cause only."81 After being fired without cause, the former employee
brought suit based upon the language contained in the handbook. 82 The
Michigan Supreme Court ignored traditional contract requirements such
as consideration and bargained-for exchange83 and instead rested its
decision upon general equitable principles. The court stated that the
handbook provision must be enforced to avoid an "unfair" result.84 The
court held it would be inequitable to allow an employer to gain from an
"orderly, cooperative and loyal work force" and then ignore its promises
to those employees." As with the Woolley decision, the employee's
legitimate expectations were the crux of the analysis.86 The court found
the unfair result would inhere only where an employee had reasonable
expectations of certain conduct on the part of the employer.87
There are several flaws in an analysis based on whether or not the
termination decision is "equitable" or "unfair." An analysis based only
on fairness is arbitrary and leaves too much room for argument and
manipulation. The uncertainty in claims based on equitable principles
leaves attorneys and judges guessing as to how such claims should
proceed. This leads to results that lack uniformity and causes confusion
as to what the law really is. Some courts have specified that the
reasonable expectations of the employee should determine what is fair
and equitable.8 However, determining what constitutes reasonable
80. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
81. The handbook stated that the employer's intention was "to provide for the administration of
fair, consistent and reasonable corrective discipline," id. at 893, and "to treat employees leaving Blue
Cross in a fair and consistent manner and to release employees for just cause only," id. at 884.
82. Id. at 883.
83. Richard Wall, At Will Employment in Washington: A Review of Thompson v. St. Regis Paper
Co. and its Progeny, 14 U. Puget. Sound L. Rev. 71, 82 (1990).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. The court stated that it was simply enforcing "an employee's legitimate expectations."
Toussaint, 292 N.W. 2d at 892.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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expectations is as broad a task as ascertaining what is fair when no
further guidance is provided. Whereas analyzing claims under unilateral
contract theory is too restraining for implied-in-fact contract claims,
using equitable principles as a guide is too loose.
B. Confusion About Which Traditional Legal Theory Applies
Woolley and Toussaint are based upon two entirely diftfrent theories
of law. Yet, courts and commentators have cited the two cases
interchangeably, as if standing for the same proposition. 9 In a sense,
they do stand for the same thing: that an employee may base a wrongful
discharge claim upon representations made in an employee handbook
under the implied-in-fact contract theory. However, the means used to
arrive at this end are entirely different.
Problems have arisen in the Washington courts' attempts to apply
implied-in-fact contract limitations to employment at will relationships.
Unlike the Woolley decision, few opinions clearly spell out whether the
court's analysis is based upon a strict interpretation of contract law or
equitable principles. This lack of clarity has led to the intermingling of
different theories in many instances.9" Courts will frequently
acknowledge one theory as the rule and then apply another in its
analysis.9 Such ambiguity leaves attorneys and subsequent courts
guessing as to which theory governs implied-in-fact contract claims.
Thompson demonstrates the problems that have arisen due to lack of
uniformity in this area. The Thompson decision was the first decision in
Washington to recognize wrongful discharge claims based upon implied-
in-fact contract theory.92 In Thompson, the Washington Supreme Court
relied heavily on Toussaint in carving out the exception to employment
at will. Directly quoting from the Toussaint opinion, the court stated:
[W]here an employer chooses to establish such policies and
practices and makes them known to its employees, the employment
relationship is presumably enhanced. The employer secures an
89. Chagares, supra note 76, at 477 ("The Towusaint decision has been followed by the majority
of jurisdictions. New Jersey recently joined these jurisdictions by recognizing the enforceability of
promises in policy manuals through its ruling in Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.") (footnotes
omitted).
90. See, e.g., Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 1'.2d 1081 (1984).
Thompson is an excellent example of a case that seems to rely upon both theories in different parts of
the opinion. For a more thorough discussion, see infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 230, 635 P.2d at 1088.
92. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
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orderly, cooperative and loyal work force, and the employee the
peace of mind associated with job security and the conviction that
he will be treated fairly. . . .The employer has then created a
situation 'instinct with an obligation.'
93
The Toussaint court used the language quoted above to set up the
equitable principles theory. After quoting Toussaint, however, the
Washington Supreme Court proceeded to establish a test for implied-in-
fact contract claims more akin to traditional contract law. The Thompson
test requires "promises of specific treatment in specific situations."94 In
defining this test, the court used the Restatement (Second) of Contracts'
definition of a promise.95 The court then went on to further refine its test
by virtually quoting the Restatement's requirements for an offer in a
unilateral contract.96 The Thompson court used both the Toussaint
reasoning and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts' definitions of
promise and offer to create the rule that sets forth the requirements for a
valid suit.
In the aftermath of the Thompson decision, Washington appellate
courts have struggled to determine the appropriate theory in wrongful
discharge suits based on the implied-in-fact contract theory. While some
courts read Thompson as strictly interpreting contract law,97 other courts
feel it incorporates equitable principles.98 This result has led to
inconsistent applications of the Thompson test.99
93. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 229-30, 685 P.2d at 1087-88.
94. Id. at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088.
95 Id.; see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 (1981) ("[P]romise is a manifestation of
intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promise in
understanding a commitment has been made.").
96. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088 ("We believe that by his or her unilateral
objective manifestation of intent, the employer creates an expectation, and thus an obligation of
treatment in accord with those written promises.").
97. Drobny v. Boeing Co., 80 Wash. App. 97, 907 P.2d 299 (1995), uses an analysis closely
correlated with contract law. "In the absence of a written policy providing promises of specific
treatment in specific situations, oral representations by an employee's supervisor are insufficient to
establish an enforceable promise." Id at 107, 907 P.2d at 305.
98. Messerly v. Asamera Minerals, (U.S.) Inc., 55 Wash. App. 811, 815, 780 P.2d 1327, 1330
(1989), has an analysis more akin to equitable considerations. The opinion quotes the language from
both Thompson and Toussaint basing enforceability of an implied-in-fact contract on employers
creating atmospheres ofjob security and fair treatment. Id. at 815, 780 P.2d at 1330.
99. Winspear v. Boeing Co., 75 Wash. App. 870, 880 P.2d 1010 (1994), uses a strict contractual
analysis in an attempt to follow Thompson. Payne v. Sunnyside Community Hospital, 78 Wash.
App. 34, 894 P.2d 1379 (1995), also follows Thompson but draws from it a test more akin to the
equitable considerations doctrine. Wall, supra note 83, comments on the difficulty of ascertaining
which theory Thompson uses.
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C. Mishandling Disclaimers
Wrongful discharge claims based on the implied-in-fact contract
theory have been further clouded by the widespread use of disclaimers
and the inconsistent treatment that disclaimers have received. Thompson
stated that employers may avoid legally binding themselves by
statements made in employee handbooks through the use of properly
worded and conspicuously located disclaimers.' This rule prevails in
most jurisdictions.' Under strict contractual analysis, disclaimers
qualify the offer. A valid disclaimer makes it unreasonable for the
employee to interpret the handbook as an expression by o:ae party of its
assent to certain definite terms. Similarly, disclaimers nullify claims
under the equitable considerations theory by removing an employee's
legitimate expectations. When expectations are removed, it is not
"unfair" to treat language in employee handbooks as non-binding. On the
surface, this creates an unambiguous rule. A valid disclaimer destroys the
employee's case, whereas the absence of a valid disclaimer binds the
employer to its statements. The confusion arises from three main sources:
courts (1) finding the same disclaimer to be valid at one point and invalid
at another; (2) using disclaimers as the false crux of a more complicated
test; and (3) wrongfully concluding its analysis after examining only the
disclaimer.
1. Finding the Same Disclaimer To Be Valid and Invalid-Confusion
Caused by Subsequent Inconsistent Conduct
The transitory nature of findings regarding the validity of disclaimers
causes the first area of confusion. In Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., °2 the
Washington Supreme Court stated in dicta that "an employer's
inconsistent representations can negate the effect of a disclaimer."'0 3 This
idea was first posited by Michael A. Chagares in a 1989 article quoted
directly by the Washington Supreme Court."°4 In this article, Chagares
100. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 231, 685 P.2d at 1088. What constitutes such a disclaimer is
another area of law to which commentators have devoted much commentary, but is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
101. Patricia M. Lenard, Unjust Dismissal of Employees at Will: Are Disclaimers a Final
Solution?, 15 Fordham Urb. L.J. 533, 550 (1986-87).
102. 118 Wash. 2d 512, 826 P.2d 664 (1992).
103. Id. at 532, 826 P.2d at 674.
104. Id. (quoting Chagares, supra note 14, at 365).
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explains that oral assurances or other inconsistent language in an
employee handbook may invalidate a disclaimer." 5
Examples of statements that have overrun disclaimers to the
contrary are detailed grievance or disciplinary procedures to be
taken before discharge and exclusive lists of reasons for discharge.
Moreover, statements espousing job security, permanent,
continuous, or future employment, and statements speaking of
salary in specific periodic terms, may be found to override
disclaimers defining the employment relationship as terminable at
the will of either party. 6
Chagares further explained that contradictory employment practices
by the employer can at times override a disclaimer." 7 The main idea
behind such thinking is that disclaimers should not be used as a "get out
of jail free card" by the employer. Employers should not be permitted to
benefit from increased employee satisfaction by making unenforceable
promises of better working conditions and then be permitted to fall back
on a disclaimer. Washington decisions have overridden disclaimers
through oral representations, consistent employer practices, and
inconsistent language within the same handbook." 8
However, Washington appellate court analysis used in overriding
disclaimers has been unclear. The main problem is that courts find the
same disclaimer valid at one point in time and invalid at another. The
Payne v. Sunnyside Community Hospital"9 case aptly illustrates this
problem. In Payne, the employer had distributed an employee handbook
that outlined termination procedures."0 On the first page of the
handbook, the employer had inserted a disclaimer."' Contrary to the
disclaimer, the termination procedures in the handbook contained
language indicating that implementation of the termination policy was
105. Chagares, supra note 14, at 392.
106. Id. at 392-93 (footnotes omitted).
107. Id. at 393.
108. See Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 118 Wash. 2d 512, 532, 826 P.2d 664, 674 (1992)
(discussing and approving all three techniques of invalidating disclaimers).
109. 78 Wash. App. 34, 894 P.2d 1379 (1995).
110. Id. at 35-37, 894 P.2d at 1380-81.
111. Id. at 37, 894 P.2d at 1381 ("Employees have the right to resign the employment at any time,
without notice,for any reason or no reason. The [employer] retains a similar right to discontinuation
of the employment of any employee.").
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mandatory." 2 Further, the employee showed that the employer had acted
inconsistently with the disclaimer by telling managers that hey needed to
follow the termination procedures." 3  Despite these inconsistent
representations, the trial court found the disclaimer facially sufficient and
granted summary judgment to the employer on the employee's wrongful
discharge claim."4
On appeal, the appellate court reversed. The appellate court found that
the disclaimer was facially valid."' However, upon further examination,
the court found that the subsequent language in the handbook and oral
representations by the employer made the disclaimer ambiguous and
hence invalid.'16 Thus, the same disclaimer was found explicitly valid
and invalid within the same opinion."
7
Placing contradictory labels on the same disclaimer obviously can
lead to some confusion. If a court finds a disclaimer valid, it should
remain valid. Subsequent conduct could override a valid disclaimer, but
that would not take away from the fact that it is a valid disclaimer.
Following Payne and current analysis techniques, courts analyze
disclaimers in an ongoing fashion, making any findings about the
disclaimer temporary and meaningless. This flexibility and uncertainty as
to when, if ever, a disclaimer is valid causes some of the confusion in
implied-in-fact contract analysis.
2. Ending Analysis After Examination ofDisclaimers
Much of the remaining confusion based on disclaimers in implied-in-
fact contract claims stems from Washington appellate courts' uncertainty
as to when analysis should conclude. A very similar case to Payne
decided by the same district is illustrative. In Nelson v. Southland
Corp.,"8 the plaintiff, Roxanne Nelson, sued her employer for wrongful
discharge. Nelson claimed that the employer was contractually bound to
follow a pre-termination progressive counseling system outlined in an
112. The manual preceded the termination procedures with the wording, "the steps to be
followed... are as follows" and followed it with "all steps.., will be used." Id. at 36, 894 P.2d at
1381.
113. Id. at 36-38, 894 P.2d at 1381-82.
114. Id.
115. Id at 37, 894 P.2d at 1381.
116. Id. at40, 894 P.2d at 1383.
117. Id.
118. 78 Wash. App. 25, 894 P.2d 1385 (1995).
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employee handbook before the employer could fire her."9 Further,
Nelson alleged that the disclaimers contained in the handbook were
negated by subsequent inconsistent practices by the employer. 2
Specifically, Nelson stated that she and other managers had been told
that the progressive counseling system must be followed before all
terminations.' In defense against the suit, the employer relied upon the
validity of the disclaimer. The trial court granted the employer's motion
for summary judgment, and the appellate court affirmed. ' The appellate
court found the disclaimer valid and seemingly wanted to end its analysis
at that point. The court stated without explanation that "Mrs. Nelson
could not rely upon the fact [that the employer] used the procedures in
other disciplinary proceedings,"'2 as the plaintiff had been permitted to
do in Payne. The court attempted to simplify analysis by determining the
outcome through a facial examination of the disclaimer.
The Nelson court seemed to think that it had performed all that was
required for the decision by finding a valid disclaimer,2 4 but factors
external to the disclaimer clearly played a role in the court's decision.
Though the court never fully addressed the issue of consistent employer
practices, much discussion was directed to the fact that language used in
the handbook was phrased in a non-mandatory fashion. By using "may"
as opposed to "shall" in conjunction with implementation of the
termination procedures, the integrity of the disclaimer remained intact.
25
The court stated that the outcome was determined solely by the
disclaimer, but then belied that statement by analyzing potential
inconsistencies to the disclaimer. 26 Like many courts, the Nelson court
was confused as to where analysis should end and attempted to end it
prematurely. Another court following the Nelson decision could think
119. Id. at 26-27, 894 P.2d at 1385.
120. Id. at 27, 894 P.2d at 1385.
121. Id. at 29, 894 P.2d at 1387.
122. Id. at 26-27, 894 P.2d at 1385.
123. ld at 33-34, 894 P.2d at 1389. Contra Payne v. Sunnyside Community Hosp., 78 Wash.
App 34,36-38, 894 P.2d 1379, 1381-82 (1995).
124. This seems especially apparent from the court's discussion at the end of the opinion where it
states its conclusions:
As a matter of law, by including the disclaimers within the very policies and procedures at issue,
Southland provided Mrs. Nelson with reasonable notice it did not intend to be bound by them.
In addition, the disclaimers were effective as a matter of law. Mrs. Nelson could not rely upon
the fact Southland used the procedures in other disciplinary proceedings.
Nelson, 78 Wash. App at 33-34, 894 P.2d at 1389.
125. Id. at 27, 33, 894 P.2d at 1386, 1389.
126. Id. at 30-33, 894 P.2d at 1387-89.
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that analysis should end after examining the disclaimer. This would
contradict the rule established by the Washington Supreme Court in the
Swanson decision that subsequent employer conduct may invalidate the
disclaimer.'27
Simply by examining the Nelson and Payne decisions, the confusion
over implied-in-fact contract wrongful discharge claims becomes
apparent. In Payne, the court analyzed the disclaimer in an ongoing
fashion. The disclaimer was deemed valid by the court at one point, and
then invalid the next. In Nelson, the same appellate court ended its
examination after finding the disclaimer valid, contradicting the Swanson
decision. The Nelson court's efforts to simplify the analysis only clouded
it further. Neither Payne nor Nelson provides an ideal approach to
analyzing implied-in-fact contract claims. Because no Washington
Supreme Court case has squarely addressed the issue, appellate courts are
unsure as to which approach, if either, is appropriate.
D. Courts Drawing Fine Lines: Payne and Nelson-Two Cases
Decided by One Word.
The facts of Payne and Nelson are strikingly similar. Yet, one
employee was permitted to sue, while the other employee's claim was
dismissed. The only clear difference in the cases is that one employee
handbook stated the employer "may" initiate progressive counseling
before discharging employees, 128 and the other handbook used the words
"will be used" in reference to its termination procedures. 129 Should cases
be distinguishable due to the choice of a single word in a complicated
document that most employees do not even read? If so, on what basis?
The only consistency in reasoning between the opinions is an identical
statement appearing in both Payne and Nelson: "the crucial question is
whether the employee has a reasonable expectation [of non-employment
at will]."'30 In both opinions, this statement stands in isolation,
surrounded by muddied analysis. No discussion of reasonable
expectations takes place elsewhere in either opinion, and neither decision
seems based on this factor. The opinions merely mention the proposition
in passing and then proceed to ignore it. The court's logic in Nelson was
127. Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 118 Wash. 2d 512,532, 826 P.2d 664, 67411992).
128. Payne v. Sunnyside Community Hosp., 78 Wash. App. 34,36,894 P.2d 1379, 1381 (1995).
129. Nelson, 78 Wash. App. at 27, 894 P.2d at 1386.
130. Payne, 78 Wash. App. at 42, 894 P.2d at 1384; Nelson, 78 Wash. App. at 32, 894 P.2d at
1388.
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that the handbook said "may" in reference to the termination procedures,
and the disclaimer was therefore unambiguous and valid. In Payne, the
handbook stated that the termination procedures "will be used," so the
disclaimer lacked sufficient clarity and was invalid. Both of these
conclusory statements are confusing and neither seem to directly follow
any clear line of reasoning. To clarify its analysis, the Nelson court need
merely have stated that because the handbook used "may," the employee
had no reasonable expectation that the procedures would be followed. In
Payne, on the other hand, the more mandatory language reasonably
raised the employee's expectations that the procedures would be
followed, justifying a legal claim. However, the Payne and Nelson court
did not use this reasoning-nor has any other court in Washington.
IV. A NEW ANALYSIS
A. The Reasonable Expectations Test
In all wrongful discharge claims based on implied-in-fact contract
theory, the employer's liability should turn on whether or not the
employee had reasonable expectations of something other than
employment at will. Such claims need not rely upon traditional areas of
law. Implied-in-fact contract suits never were entirely governed by
traditional strictures anyway-courts ignored some of the traditional
legal requirements in allowing the claims.' Instead, implied-in-fact
contract suits have developed their own law and their own test. That test
is the reasonable expectations of the employee. Courts should follow this
test as the standard in implied-in-fact contract claims and abandon the
fiction of applying traditional theories that do not fit.
1. Removing Uncertainty as to Which Traditional Legal Theory
Should Govern
By adopting the reasonable expectations test free from traditional
restraints, confusion as to which area of law governs the claims is
resolved. Courts and commentators have struggled to place wrongful
discharge claims into a specific area of the law, such as unilateral
contract or equitable principles. Under either traditional theory of law,
the ultimate test for the claim can been reduced to whether or not the
discharged employees had the reasonable expectation that their status as
employees at will had been altered. If reasonable expectations exist under
131. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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contract law, then courts manipulate the reasoning and find that an offer
exists. Hence, unilateral contract theory supports a claira if reasonable
expectations are found. In the cases applying the equitable considerations
doctrine, the employee's reasonable expectation forms the basis for
determining whether or not it would be unfair to treat the employee as
employed at will. Thus, the theory of law relied upon to support the
claim has become meaningless because the case law has developed
identical tests in implied-in-fact contract claims regardless of the
underlying theoretical legal basis. This uniformity bolsters the contention
that a reasonable expectations test should control.
2. Forcing Claims into a Traditional Area ofLaw Is No Longer
Justified
The need to rationalize wrongful discharge claims by basing them on
a specific area of traditional law is no longer necessary and only clouds
the analysis. Nearly every state agrees that wrongful di3charge claims
based upon an implied-in-fact contract theory should be permitted. 3 '
Such widespread acceptance obviates courts' need to lean on the crutch
of another area of law to permit such claims. By making claims
dependent upon another area of law that does not strictly apply, legal
reasoning loses its strength. If courts attempt to lean on a strict
interpretation of contract law and a unilateral contrac t theory, the
requirements of a bargained-for agreement and mutuality must be
circumvented or ignored, as courts have unnecessarily done for many
years now. Basing claims on the ambiguous notion of equitable
considerations leaves too much room for argument in an area of law that
has been distilled to a test of the employee's reasonable expectations.
Courts should not be required to rationalize claims under a traditional
area of law, but instead should simply state that such claims will be
permitted and that the test under such claims will be the reasonable
expectations of the employee. After such a step is taken, courts must
refine a reasonable expectations test.
B. The Five Factors of the Reasonable Expectations Test
Determining what factors to examine in a reasonable expectations test
is the next step in developing a new analysis.' Through numerous cases,
132. See supra note 64.
133. The question of whether a judge or jury should analyze the following factors and make the
ultimate determination, the subject of much debate in this area, is left to other coramentaries.
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Washington courts have stressed particular indicators of what makes an
employee's expectations reasonable. An examination of the cases reveals
that courts have found five factors to be the most prominent:1
34
(1) use or non-use of disclaimers;'35
(2) use of specific rather than general language; 136
(3) use of mandatory as opposed to optional language; 37
(4) whether a pattern of practice has developed; and'38
(5) whether the employer has made oral or written representations
inconsistent with employment at will. 139
Further, as a threshold question, the employee must show awareness of
the handbook language at issue. 4'
1. Disclaimers
The use and attributes of a disclaimer play a primary role in
determining the employee's expectations. Courts have established
extensive case law indicating how a disclaimer should be analyzed, and
such precedent should remain the foundation for determining the effect
of a disclaimer. However, in implied-in-fact contract suits, the traditional
means of analyzing disclaimers--conspicuousness, location, font size,
boldness or color of type, and whether or not it was explicitly pointed out
to the party"4 -should be cast through the light of how they affect
reasonable expectations.
134. A sixth factor not mentioned here but emphasized in a few stray cases is the employee's
subjective belief. See, e.g., Stewart v. Chevron Chem. Co., 111 Wash. 2d 609, 762 P.2d 1143, 1146
(1988).
135. See notes 102-117 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (requiring use of "specific language"
directed at "specific circumstances" and comparing to vague representations promising "fair
treatment" that have fallen short).
137. See Payne v. Sunnyside Community Hosp., 78 Wash. App. 34, 36, 894 P.2d 1379, 1381
(1995). Contra Nelson v. Southland Corp., 78 Wash. App. 25, 33, 894 P.2d 1385, 1389 (1995).
138. See Payne, 78 Wash. App. at 36, 894 P.2d at 1381.
139. The employers in Payne, id. at 35-36, 894 P.2d at 1380, and Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp.,
118 Wash. 2d 512, 514, S26 P.2d 664, 665 (1992), both made such representations.
140. See Stewart v. Chevron Chem. Co., 11l Wash. 2d 609, 615, 762 P.2d 1143, 1146 (1988)
(employee failed to show he was aware of relevant provision in employee handbook). This
subjective test differentiates the reasonable expectations test established in this Comment from that
set up in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 (1981).
141. See, e.g., Nettles v. Techplan Corp., 704 F. Supp. 95 (D.S.C. 1988) (contrast in type or color
not required when disclaimer is contained in separate paragraph on first page of manual); Bailey v.
Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 120 (N.D. 1986) (disclaimer language placed inside box
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2. Specific vs. General Language
Courts consistently have found the use of specific language in
employee handbooks more likely to bind the employer than vague,
general terms. In permitting suit to proceed, the Thompson court relied
upon a promise of "specific treatment in specific situations."' 42 Several
appellate courts have followed ths lead, some calling it "the test."'43
Suits relying on language using vague general terms consistently have
failed.'" Courts have found promises of "good" or "fair" treatment
insufficient as the basis of a claim.'45 Typically, the handbook must spell
out that when employees are terminated, they will be entitled to certain,
exact procedures. Specifically worded language is more likely to raise an
employee's expectations. Hence, &te more precisely the handbook states
when the employee is entitled to certain treatment and what precisely that
treatment is, the stronger the case.
3. Mandatory vs. Optional Language
Though somewhat related to language specificity, this factor more
narrowly focuses on the verb used in the manual to indicate how the
employer will act. From a broad examination, the Nelson and Payne
cases seem quite similar, yet suit was permitted in Payne and not in
Nelson. The court based its decision, at least in part, upon the fact that
one handbook used the wording "will follow," and the other used "may
use."' 46 When optional language such as "may" is employed, the court
found that, absent other factors, the footing for an employee's reasonable
expectations is shaky at best.
immediately after introductory section was conspicuous); Chadwick v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 33
Wash. App. 297, 654 P.2d 1215 (1982) (one who acknowledges understanding of document cannot
claim to have been misled thereby).
142. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984).
143. See, e.g., Drobny v. Boeing Co., 80 Wash. App. 97, 101,907 P.2d 299, 302 (1995).
144. Id.; Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 228, 635 P.2d at 1087 (specifically disallowing wrongful
discharge suits in Washington based on implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). In such
cases, terms in an employment handbook promising fair or good treatment create the alleged
obligation. The Washington Supreme Court disallowed such claims because it reasoned that the
language relied upon by employees in such suits is too general.
145. See, e.g., Nelson v. Southland Corp., 78 Wash. App. 25,33, 894 P.2d 1385, 1389 (1995).
146. See Payne v. Sunnyside Community Hosp., 78 Wash. App. 34, 36, 894 P.2d 1379, 1381
(1995). Contra Nelson, 78 Wash. App. at 33, 894 P.2d at 1389.
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The Nelson decision attempted to capture this factor by claiming that
suit will not arise in the absence of "contractual terms."'47 To the court,
"may" was not a contractual term. Relying upon whether or not
contractual terms are employed makes little sense in a reasonable
expectations analysis. The average employee is unaware of the difference
between contractual and non-contractual terms. Because typical
employees will not be able to differentiate between the two, their
reasonable expectations will not be founded upon such categorical
determinations. If a factor does not affect reasonable expectations, it
should not be incorporated into the test.
Though the concept of contractual terms may be foreign, an employee
is capable of distinguishing mandatory from optional language.
Mandatory language raises employee expectations that procedures will
be followed, making a claim more justified. By using optional language,
the employer keeps reasonable expectations uncertain and strengthens its
defense against claims.
4. Pattern of Practice
When an employer develops a pattern of practice regarding employee
termination, consistently performing certain procedures in certain
situations, employees will likely be reasonable in believing that the
practice will be applied to them if they are in the same situation. The
Payne court stressed this factor.'4 8 The opinion mentioned that the
employer subjected all other terminated employees to the procedures
outlined in the handbook.'49 Also strongly indicative of a pattern of
practice, the employee in Payne was a person with managerial
responsibilities who had been told that the procedures must be followed
in firing all employees and had followed the procedures accordingly
when called upon to do so. 5 ' These two examples illustrate the most
common means of establishing a pattern of practice.
In order for this factor to favor the employee, the pattern must be
consistent enough that the employee would be reasonable in thinking that
the procedure is employed in all cases.' If the promised procedure is not
employed in all cases, then the cases where the procedure was lacking
147. Nelson, 78 Wash. App. at 33, 894 P.2d at 1389.
148. Payne, 78 Wash. App. at 37, 894 P.2d at 1381.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Birge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 73 Wash. App. 895, 872 P.2d 49 (1994).
1181
Washington Law Review
must fall into clearly identifiable circumstances that cons:istently exempt
the employer.'52 The employee also must establish awareness of the
pattern of practice.'
5. Inconsistent Oral or Written Representations
An employee's reasonable expectations will be affected when the
employer makes representations to the employee inconsistent with the
notion that they are employed at will, or consistent with the notion that
termination procedures will be followed.'54 Examining his factor in a
reasonable expectations analysis prevents employers from making empty
promises or inducing employees tc. work under false pretenses, and then
using employment at will as an escape hatch for firing the employee.'
5
The Payne and Swanson cases are illustrative. The Payne decision,
reversing summary dismissal of the employee's claim, found that the
employer's statement to the emplcyee that termination procedures "had
to be followed" strongly favored the employee's case.' 6 Ia Swanson, the
court relied heavily on a written memo given to all employees in
allowing the employee's claim.'57 The memo stated that employees could
only be terminated without following certain procedures for a few
enumerated reasons. 58 When the employee was fired inccnsistently with
the memo he sued for wrongful discharge. The Washington Supreme
Court used the memo as the main factor in its decision to permit the
employee's suit.
59
152. Probationary employees are often exempt from procedures mandated by employee
handbooks. See, e.g., Payne, 78 Wash. App. at 38-39, 894 P.2d at 1382; Nelson v. Southland Corp.,
78 Wash. App. 25, 28, 894 P.2d 1379, 1386 (195,5).
153. Chagares, supra note 14, at 393.
154. See supra text accompanying note 106; accord Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 118 Wash. 2d
512,532, 826 P.2d 664, 674 (1992).
155. See supra text accompanying note 106; accord Swanson, 118 Wash. 2c at 532, 826 P.2d at
674.
156. Payne, 78 Wash. App. at 37, 894 P.2d at 1381.
157. Swanson, 118 Wash. 2d at 532, 826 P.2d at 674. In Swanson, the disclaimer and handbook
were clear about employment being at will. Id. However, a subsequently distributed memo
contradicted the handbook. Id.
158. Id. at 516, 826 P.2d at 666.
159. Id. at 532, 826 P.2d at 674.
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V. AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF IMPLEMENTING THE
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS TEST
A. Justifying Escape from Employment at Will and Traditional Areas
of Law
Instituting a reasonable expectations test that does not rely on a
traditional area of law is a major step away from employment at will.
Previously, courts permitted escape from the doctrine only when it could
be founded on one of the pillars of American jurisprudence. Dispensing
with the fiction of basing wrongful discharge suits under the implied-in-
fact contract theory on traditional areas of contract law or equity
overturns a system that Washington and other state courts have used for
many years. Courts do not take such large steps away from precedent
lightly. In the present case, it is a step that would be well justified and
that should be taken.
The justifications for employment at will no longer exist in present
times. Bargaining positions, growth rates, and turnover rates have
changed drastically in the one hundred years since Wood first enunciated
the theory. Employment at will was implemented as a rule beneficial to
both employers and employees. Today, employers hold a much stronger
bargaining position in the workplace, and strict adherence to employment
at will permits them to abuse that position.'60 The conditions that spurred
the creation of the doctrine are simply gone.
Because the conditions supporting an employment at will rule no
longer exist, courts and legislatures have created numerous exceptions to
the doctrine, weakening the strength of employment at will as a
foundation for American employment law. Between the legislative and
the judicial diminishing of employment at will, all that is left of the
doctrine is the essential core. Though at one time the concept dominated
the legal relationship between employer and employee, dissatisfaction
with employment at will has led to diminution of the doctrine to the point
where it is the exception rather than the rule in the workplace
environment.
Although there is much debate over whether or not employment at
will should be done away with entirely,' 6' virtually all courts agree that
wrongful discharge claims based on implied-in-fact contract theory
160. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
161. See generally Peck, supra note 21.
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should be allowed.162 Because such a clear consensus exist; to allow such
claims, courts should no longer feel bound to explain the departure from
employment at will or justify it by leaning on a traditional theory of law
that does not fit. The reasons for allowing implied-in-fact contract claims
have been spelled out and almost universally accepted. Employers should
not be allowed to promise employees certain treatment, inducing them to
work in a more dedicated, loyal and productive fashion, and then use
employment at will as a safety net when breaking those promises. 163 The
concept that employers should not be permitted to make empty promises
to their employees is one that has been widely accepted in the American
legal community."6 Rationalizing allowance of such claims is no longer
necessary.
Implied-in-fact contract claims are founded upon such a strong policy
and have been so widely accepted that they should now be permitted to
stand on their own. Courts permit such treatment for wrongful discharge
claims based upon the public policy exception. The public policy
exception, which, like implied-in-fact contract claims, is adhered to in
almost every state,165 does not rely on any traditional area of law but is an
area of law unto itself. Implied-in-fact contract claims should be treated
in the same fashion.
B. Disclaimer Problems Are Solved
By looking at the disclaimer as one factor in the reasonable
expectations analysis, the confusion associated with disclaimers no
longer exists. Courts' tendencies to identify the same disclaimer as both
valid and invalid pose the first problem. This problem is :aow solved in
that disclaimers can be examined, found either valid or invalid, and
remain such. An invalid disclaimer strongly indicates that an employer
should be bound by later statements. A valid disclaimer favors the
employer's case considerably, but may be invalidated by the other
factors in the test. This result permits employers to write disclaimers that
help keep employment at will intact, but prevents the inequitable result
of a disclaimer permitting an employer to make promises to the
employee without being bound.
162. See supra note 64.
163. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 64.
165. See supra note 34.
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The second area of confusion generated by disclaimers involved the
courts' preliminary termination of analysis. This area of confusion also
disappears by definition under the new test. Courts will no longer attempt
to end analysis after examination of the disclaimer. They must continue
to determine how the other four factors may have potentially affected the
employee's reasonable expectations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current means of analyzing wrongful discharge suits based on
promises in employee handbooks is unsatisfactory. Confusion as to the
area of law into which implied-in-fact contract claims should be forced
and how to handle disclaimers has led to a cluttered state of law. The
reasonable expectations of the employee have lurked underneath courts'
analyses, and should now come to the forefront. The reasonable
expectations of the employee, judged by the five factors Washington
courts have stressed in implied-in-fact contract cases, should form the
basis for the court's decision in employee handbook cases. Doctrinal
pigeonholing of exceptions to employment at will into traditional
concepts of contract law and equity is no longer necessary due to the
nearly universally accepted demise of the strict at-will conception of the
employment relationship in recent decades. Making the employee's
reasonable expectations the ultimate test will lead to tighter, more
straight-forward analysis, benefiting both employees and employers with
an increase in certainty and predictability of law.
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